Federal Undercover Operations & Sting Defense
Federal sting operations are presented as sophisticated police work that catches criminals in the act. The narrative is simple: undercover agents create an opportunity, and criminals reveal themselves by seizing it. What the narrative doesn't mention is that judges have called these operations "outrageous government conduct," that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals declared "the real lead conspirator was the United States," or that the entrapment defense - the legal protection supposedly available when government goes too far - succeeds less than 1% of the time in federal court.
The mathematics of sting operations reveal what the press releases conceal. Between 2006 and 2010, only 22 defendants nationwide successfully claimed entrapment out of thousands of federal prosecutions. That's a success rate so low it's essentially zero. Meanwhile, of 94 defendants targeted by ATF fake stash house stings in Chicago from 2006 to 2013, 92% were Black or Hispanic - a disparity an expert statistician concluded had a "zero percent likelihood" of happening by chance. These aren't sting operations catching existing criminals. These are manufactured crimes targeting vulnerable populations, with the government providing the plan, the resources, the fake drugs, the fake weapons, and sometimes the motivation.
Spodek Law Group has represented clients contacted by undercover agents and confidential informants across hundreds of federal cases. Todd Spodek knows that sting cases present impossible strategic choices: raise entrapment and you must admit guilt, go to trial, and face an enhanced sentence when the defense fails. Don't raise entrapment and you're convicted of a crime the government manufactured from scratch. Our mission is to help you understand what prosecutors and agents won't explain - that the entrapment defense is designed to fail, that confidential informants are permitted to use more aggressive tactics than sworn agents, and that "predisposition" can be proven with social media posts from five years ago or jokes you made with friends. Before you engage with anyone offering criminal opportunities that seem too easy, before you respond to that person who keeps pushing you toward illegal conduct, call 212-300-5196. Because the moment you agree, the sting is complete - and the entrapment defense probably won't save you.
When the Government Creates the Crime From Scratch
The ATF stash house sting operation worked like this: a paid confidential informant would approach someone "down on their luck" and tell them about a house supposedly filled with kilos of cocaine, guarded by only one or two people. The informant would explain they could rob this stash house and make hundreds of thousands of dollars in a single day. Everything about the crime was fake - the house didn't exist, the cocaine didn't exist, the guards didn't exist. The only real part was the defendant who agreed to rob the nonexistent house, and the 15-year mandatory minimum sentence that followed.
Between 2011 and 2014, the ATF ran these operations systematically. Out of 94 people selected by the ATF to commit this manufactured offense in the Chicago area from 2006 to 2013, approximately 92% were Black or Hispanic. An expert hired by the University of Chicago Law School Federal Criminal Justice Clinic analyzed the data and concluded there was a "zero percent likelihood" this racial disparity happened by chance. Of those 94 defendants, 74 were Black, 12 were Hispanic, and only 8 were white. The ATF had internal criteria for selecting targets, but litigation revealed that when targeting people of color, they frequently ignored their own criteria. When targeting white individuals, they followed there criteria closely.
Federal judges eviscerated these operations. Judge Otis Wright in California dismissed one case as "outrageous" government conduct that was "unconstitutional," stating it had neither prevented nor detected crime - it had manufactured crime. Judge Rubén Castillo determined lawyers had made "a strong showing of potential bias." The operations were described by multiple judges as "tawdry" schemes that recruited "unsophisticated, and perhaps desperate" people - usually poor people of color - for crimes that would never have existed without government creation. Eventually, the ATF abandoned the tactic after widespread judicial criticism. But not before those 94 defendants faced mandatory minimums of 15 to 25 years.
The FBI terrorism sting operations followed a similar pattern, but with even higher stakes. The Newburgh Four case from 2009 is the paradigm. A federal judge declared that "the real lead conspirator was the United States." The Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted that an FBI informant, not the defendants, "inspired the crime, provoked it, planned it, financed it, equipped it, and furnished the time and targets." The informant was Shahed Hussain, a paid FBI asset who earned nearly $100,000 for his work on this single plot.
Hussain met James Cromitie in 2008 in the parking lot of a mosque in Newburgh, New York - a town with high poverty and a large Muslim community. Cromitie was broke. Hussain offered extravagant enticements, eventually promising Cromitie $250,000 to participate in a fake bomb plot. After initially scoping out a target, Cromitie avoided Hussain for almost two months. Then Cromitie lost his job. Desperate for money, he reinitiated contact. The FBI considered Cromitie "unlikely to commit an act without the support of the FBI source." Yet they proceeded anyway, providing fake bombs packed with inert explosives, planning the targets, financing the operation, and then arresting Cromitie and three others when they planted the fake devices.
Of 508 defendants prosecuted in federal terrorism-related cases in the decade after 9/11, 243 were involved with an FBI informant. In 158 cases, defendants were targets of sting operations were informants didnt just observe criminal activity - they led it. In 49 cases, an informant or undercover operative actually led defendants in there terrorism plots. As multiple studies found, nearly 50% of federal counterterrorism convictions resulted from informant-based cases, and almost 30% were sting operations were the informant played an active role in the underlying plot.
These aren't isolated examples. Sami Osmakac was 25 years old in 2012, broke and struggling with mental illness. His family wanted to get him help. The FBI wanted him to plot a terrorist attack. Internal FBI files showed how agents leveraged there relationship with a paid informant and plotted for months to turn Osmakac into a terrorist, despite knowing he was mentally ill. In the Rezwan Ferdaus case, an FBI agent told Ferdaus' father his son "obviously" had mental health problems. The FBI sent an informant into Ferdaus' mosque anyway. Together, the FBI informant and Ferdaus devised a plan to attack the Pentagon and U.S. Capitol, with the FBI providing fake weaponry and funding Ferdaus' travel.
The pattern is consistent: find someone vulnerable - financially desperate, mentally ill, socially isolated. Pay an informant substantial sums (often $100,000 or more, plus "performance incentives" for successful convictions). Have the informant develop a detailed attack plan or criminal scheme. Provide the resources - fake drugs, fake weapons, fake money. Overcome resistance through repeated contact, cash offers, or appeals to desperation. Then arrest the target and claim you've disrupted a dangerous criminal or terrorist. But you didnt disrupt anything. You created it.
The Entrapment Defense That Succeeds Less Than 1% of the Time
The entrapment defense exists specifically for these situations - when the government implants criminal design in the mind of an unwary innocent. The legal standard comes from the Supreme Court: "Government agents may not originate a criminal design, implant in an innocent person's mind the disposition to commit a criminal act, and then induce commission of the crime so that the Government may prosecute." That's exactly what happened in the Newburgh Four case, in the ATF stash house stings, in dozens of FBI terrorism plots. So why didn't the entrapment defense work?
Because it almost never works. The entrapment defense has a less than 1% success rate in federal court. A national empirical study found that entrapment arose in just 0.08% of cases - less than one-tenth of one percent - and usually "to little avail." Between 2006 and 2010, only 22 defendants nationwide successfully claimed entrapment. Twenty-two, out of thousands of federal prosecutions involving undercover operations.
The Supreme Court case that defendants always cite is Jacobson v. United States, decided in 1992. The government repeatedly contacted Jacobson over two years, eventually inducing him to buy child pornography. The Supreme Court ruled the government had failed to prove Jacobson was predisposed to commit the crime before there involvement. Jacobson is basically the only Supreme Court entrapment case defendants ever win. And lower courts have spent the last 30+ years distinguishing Jacobson, finding predisposition in almost every case that's followed.
Research analyzing terrorism prosecutions found that entrapment was successfully argued in a terrorism case only once - and it was notable specifically because it was the first time entrapment had succeeded in a terrorism case after three previous attempts had failed. Despite evidence that FBI informants inspired, planned, financed, and equipped the plots, despite judges calling the operations "outrageous," the entrapment defense fails. Why?
Because juries are skeptical of entrapment defenses and more likely to side with law enforcement than defendants claiming they were entrapped. Because raising entrapment requires admitting you committed the crime, which poisons any alternate defense. Because the legal test for entrapment has two parts - government inducement AND lack of predisposition - and prosecutors have become expert at proving predisposition even in cases were the government manufactured everything.
The predisposition element is were entrapment defenses go to die. Even if you can show the government induced you, provided the plan, supplied the resources, and overcame your resistance, prosecutors will prove you were "predisposed" to commit the crime. And predisposition can be proven with almost anything.
How "Predisposition" Destroys the Defense
Predisposition means you were "ready and willing" to commit the offense, merely awaiting a suitable opportunity. It doesn't require prior criminal convictions. It doesn't require you ever attempted the crime before. The "ready commission of the criminal act" - like promptly accepting an undercover agent's offer - can itself establish predisposition. You can have the requisite criminal intent and still be entrapped, but if prosecutors prove predisposition, your entrapment defense is dead regardless of how outrageous the government's conduct was.
Prosecutors don't just look at what you did after the agent or informant contacted you. They go back years. Social media posts from five years ago were you joked about doing something illegal? Evidence of predisposition. Google searches from three years ago on topics related to the crime? Predisposition. Conversations with friends were you discussed hypothetical criminal conduct? Predisposition. Prior arrests, even if charges were dismissed or you were acquitted? Admissible to prove your "criminal nature and predisposition." Employment history showing financial desperation? Motive, which prosecutors argue demonstrates you were ready and willing.
In the Newburgh Four case, despite a judge saying "the real lead conspirator was the United States," despite the informant providing $250,000 in enticements to a broke defendant who avoided him for two months, despite FBI agents believing Cromitie was "unlikely to commit an act without FBI support," the entrapment defense failed. Why? Prosecutors presented evidence that Cromitie had made anti-American statements, had expressed anger about U.S. foreign policy, had discussed wanting to do "something" to fight back. That was enough. The fact that he had no plan, no resources, no co-conspirators, and no ability to carry out any attack without the FBI creating it for him didnt matter. He had predisposition.
The legal standard is so broad that even initially refusing the government's offer doesn't prove lack of predisposition. Courts have held that reluctance or initial refusal doesn't demonstrate lack of predisposition - it just shows the government had to work a little harder to overcome natural caution. In Jacobson, the Supreme Court emphasized that the government contacted Jacobson repeatedly over two years before he finally agreed. But in most cases, courts distinguish Jacobson by finding that any agreement - even after months of pressure, even after repeated refusals, even when finally given in due to financial desperation - demonstrates predisposition.
Your criminal record is admissible. Your statements are admissible. Your Google searches are admissible. Your social media history is admissible. Prosecutors will build a predisposition case using every piece of evidence showing you ever thought about, joked about, researched, or discussed anything related to the crime - even if those thoughts or statements were years before any government contact, even if they were clearly hypothetical or not serious.
And the burden is on the government to prove predisposition beyond a reasonable doubt - but only after you've first proven government inducement. Once you show inducement, the burden shifts. But "inducement" requires more than opportunity. It requires persuasion, threats, fraudulent representations, or appeals to sympathy that overcome your reluctance. Merely presenting an opportunity isn't inducement. Using artifice, stratagem, pretense, or deceit isn't inducement. The government can lie to you about nearly everything - who they are, what there offering, what the risks are - and it's not inducement unless it rises to the level of overcoming the will of someone not predisposed.









