NEW JERSEY CRIMINAL LAWYERS

NJ OPERATION UNDER N.J.S.A. 39:4-50: STATE V. DALY

Defendant John A. Daly’s conviction for violating N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a) by operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor was overturned by the Supreme Court of New Jersey. Daly’s situational proof didn’t provide enough substance to convict him of operating a car under the influence of alcohol beyond reasonable doubt, and he wasn’t “operating” the vehicle at the time.

Daly was taken into police custody on February 15, 1972, at 3:20 a.m. for sitting in his car, parked in a tavern parking lot. The engine was running while the headlights were switched off, and he was seated comfortably in the driver’s seat with his eyes wide open when he looked up to see an officer shining his torchlight at him. The officer discovered Daly was not asleep and intoxicated upon arresting him; however, Daly indicated that he had no intention of driving his car until he sobered up later.

During his trial, Daly admitted being drunk but rejected any intention to move his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. He had fallen asleep for about an hour and twenty minutes before being woken up by the police officers arriving on-site. While waiting inside his car, he turned on the engine a couple of times just as an attempt to get comfortable warmth from within.

The legal question in this case is whether or not Defendant John A. Daly was “operating” a motor vehicle under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a). On appeal after being convicted initially by the municipal court and then later by a county court where another guilty verdict ensued with one judge differing against it.

The Appellate Division found that no evidence exists suggesting that John A. Daly had been operating his car at that point that led to reversed convictions after further appeals were filed in higher courts like NJ’s Supreme Court.
Justice Sweeney’s ruling emphasizes that ‘if there was evidence from which the trial court could clearly infer that a defendant intended to move the vehicle,’ such an individual would be convicted of having “operated” while drunk or intoxicated. But given Mr. Daly’s circumstances where there was no evidence of intent justifiable beyond reasonable doubt, he was declared innocent on this charge.

Justice Clifford while agreeing with the decision did not accept the justification provided for it. According to him, the court had twisted what constitutes operation and extended N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)’s conviction criteria for driving along state roads to other areas like stationary vehicles.
Justice Collester and Hall dissented, stating that Defendant John A. Daly intended to move the car based on sufficient proof in the record, making him guilty of operating his vehicle as defined by statute.

In conclusion, Sweeney’s rule directs that anyone acting on behalf of driving under influence should show an unambiguous intent beyond any reasonable doubt before they can be considered guilty under “operating” offenses definition per N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a). As for Defendant John A. Daly’s case, he lacks this type of evidence needed for a conviction and therefore was rightly acquitted under NJ law after multiple appeals in higher court systems finally let justice prevail.